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The paper reviews some of the existing economics of education literature from 
the  perspective  of  South  Africa’s  education  policymaking  needs.  It  also  puts 
forward  a  suggested  research  agenda  for  future  work.  The  review  is  arranged 
according  to  five  key  areas  of  analysis:  rates  of  return,  production  functions, 
teacher incentives, benefit incidence, cross-country comparisons. Whilst benefit 
incidence  analysis  is  able  to  demonstrate  large  improvements  in  the  equity  of 
public  financing,  cross-county  comparisons  reveal  that  not  only  is  quality 
inequitably  distributed,  it  is  overall  well  below  what  the  country’s  level  of 
development would predict. Production functions, especially if translated to cost 
effectiveness models, can point to important policy solutions. Rates of return are 
difficult for policymakers to interpret, and need to be viewed in the context of 
qualifications. Teacher incentives is a policy area that is badly in need of a better 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Psacharopoulos (1996a: 343), arguably one of the founders of the current economics 
of education tradition, points out: ‘In the field of education, perhaps more than in any 
other sector of the economy, politics are substituted for analysis.’ This problem in the 
education  sector  is  conceivably  brought  about  by  three  factors:  There  may  be  an 
absence of relevant analysis, the analysts may not be successful in communicating 
their findings to the policymakers, or the policymakers may resist paying attention to 
the analysts. This paper examines the first two factors. It focuses on the South African 
context, but much of the paper would be relevant to other countries, especially in the 
developing world, given the universal nature of many of the economic and policy 
issues.  
The paper takes stock of the economics of education literature that is influencing, or 
should influence, South Africa’s education policymaking through reference to a few 
key texts, though by no means all the available literature. Gaps in the literature are 
identified on the basis of assumptions of what policymakers need. The bias is towards 
a utilitarian view of the literature: it should inform policymaking and development in 
rather explicit ways. The intention is not to undermine the value of more academic 
pursuits in the economics of education field. This is undoubtedly important, but it is 
not the subject of this paper. The discussion of the literature is organised in terms of 
five key models or areas of analysis: rates of return, production functions, teacher 
incentives,  benefit-incidence  analysis,  cross-country  comparisons.  The  paper  ends 
with a tentative research agenda for economics of education in South Africa.   4 
2. RATES OF RETURN 
The  unconditional  relationship  between  earnings  and  years  of  schooling  in  South 
Africa points to an average increase in earnings of around 22% for every additional 
year of schooling possessed in the range of two to eleven years of schools, and a large 
increase of around 125% associated with the difference between eleven and twelve 
years of schooling, in other words with having attained Grade 12 (own analysis of the 
2005 Income and Expenditure Survey data of Statistics South Africa focussing on 
anyone who reported earning an income). This kind of unconditional analysis suffers 
from  two key  weaknesses.  Firstly, the net  benefits  are not  clear as  the cost,  both 
private and social, of possessing more years of schooling are not taken into account. 
Secondly, other factors such as years of experience, gender and (in particular in the 
case of South Africa) race, which may play a separate role in determining income, are 
ignored.  Two  distinct  methods  are  commonly  employed  to  overcome  these  two 
weaknesses,  though  it  is  rare  to  find  both  weaknesses  addressed  within  the  same 
analysis. Herein lies some of the confusion that surrounds rates of return to education. 
A further problem is the fact that the policy implications of rates of return analyses are 
often not explored, or they are explored in a manner that is too rudimentary to be 
helpful to policymakers. 
The  first  of  the  two  methods,  which  has  been  called  the  ‘elaborate  method’ 
(Psacharopoulos,  1981:  322  and  Woodhall,  2004:  73),  employs  the  same  basic 
internal rate of return calculation that would be used to calculate the return on a non-
education investment. This method considers both income benefits associated with 
more education, and the private and public costs of education. Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos (2002) argue that a cross-country comparison of annual rates of return, where 5 
these  rates  are  based  on  the  elaborate  method,  reveals  very  clearly  two  patterns. 
Firstly, primary schooling yields better returns than secondary schooling, which in 
turn yields better returns than tertiary education. Secondly, rates of return are higher 
the less developed a country is. A third observation would be that annual rates of 
return to education have tended to be considerably higher than world real interest rates 
(well over 10% against never over 6%), suggesting that education is a particularly 
good investment for society (Desroches and Francis, 2007: 2). 
Education rates of return for South Africa published by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 
(2002: 19) using the elaborate method are too old and unrepresentative to be useful 
for South African education policymakers. They are based on 1980 data for African 
residents of Durban (Psacharopoulos, 1993: 41). It would seem as if no subsequent 
rates of return estimates using the elaborate method have been published for South 
Africa.  
The second method, generally referred to as the Mincerian approach, makes use of an 
earnings function to examine the relative effects of years of schooling and years of 
experience  on  earnings,  and  on  a  theoretical  level  views  experience  as  informal 
schooling that occurs after one’s formal schooling has ended (Mincer, 1974: 130). It 
considers the cost of formal schooling only in terms of the opportunity cost of income 
forfeited, not in terms of the direct private and public costs of schooling.  
Strictly  speaking,  only  the  elaborate  method  yields  proper  rates  of  return  values, 
though  Mincerian  beta  coefficients  for  years  of  schooling  are  commonly  also 
described as rates of return – Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002: 3) prefer the term 
‘wage effects’ for the latter. The argument that the Mincerian approach produces rate 
of return-like statistics is sound (Woodhall, 2004: 73), but it is important to explain to 6 
policymakers that the Mincerian approach produces values that are often much lower 
than those using the elaborate approach. How much lower depends largely on whether 
the  elaborate  approach  includes  the  public  (and  even  private)  costs  of  education 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002: 12-4).  
There have been numerous rates of return analyses using the Mincerian approach with 
South African data. Keswell and Poswell (2004) present their own data analysis, plus 
a meta-analysis of previously published South African texts. (Though Keswell and 
Poswell  (2004:  841)  refer  to  some  of  their  models  as  ‘non-Mincerian’,  they  are 
essentially non-linear versions of the Mincerian approach). The Mincerian approach 
typically involves  adding additional biographic  variables not  included in Mincer’s 
(1974) original model. Keswell and Poswell (2004) include race, gender and rurality 
in their analysis. Their key finding is that the returns to schooling increase with years 
of schooling, and that at the pre-Grade 12 level in South Africa each additional year 
of  schooling  yields  almost  no  income  returns.  This  is  in  stark  contrast  to  the 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) finding that returns are highest at the primary 
level. It is important to view this not as a fundamental dispute amongst the economists 
over  the  effects  of  education,  but  rather  as  a  natural  outcome  of  using  different 
methods and different meanings attached to the term ‘rate of return’. Crucially, the 
Mincerian approach does not take into account the direct costs of education, which 
include (at least in South Africa) a high private cost of tertiary education.  
From an education planning perspective, it is useful to view the typical Mincerian 
analysis in the light of labour market signals produced by education qualifications. 
The very sharp increase in the returns to schooling at the point where twelve years of 
schooling are completed, as seen in an unconditional analysis referred to above, or in 7 
Keswell and Poswell’s (2004) sharp ‘take-off’ in the rate of return at or one year after 
Grade 12, must to a large degree be associated with the possession of a Grade 12 
certificate. This certificate, which is the only standardised qualification issued within 
the South African schooling system, may put pressure on the system to improve the 
skills and knowledge of pupils to an exceptional degree in the one or two grades 
preceding  Grade  12,  but  at  least  part  of  the  income  advantage  with  having 
successfully completed Grade 12 (as opposed to Grade 11) must  flow from one’s 
possession of a crucial and widely recognised means for signalling to employers the 
value and nature of one’s human capital. Assuming that qualifications do influence 
earnings in a manner independently of actual education, an obvious question for the 
policymaker is how changing the system of qualifications, for instance through the 
introduction of a Grade 9 certificate (something that has been on the South African 
policy  agenda  for  a  while),  might  influence  the  profile  of  returns  to  years  of 
schooling. How crucial a policy question this is is illustrated in the next graph, which 
indicates that the recent trend has been for around 60 per cent of young South African 
adults to have no qualification at all, and that there is no evidence (at least not in the 
graph) of a downward trend in this statistic.  8 
Figure 1: Highest qualification held by age (2007) 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 2007 Community Survey dataset. Note: ‘Certificate (Gr 12+)’ 
refers to Grade 12 Senior Certificate with a university entrance level. ‘No qualification (Gr 
12)’ refers to someone who attended but did not pass Grade 12, meaning he would have no 
national school qualification. ‘No qualification (<Gr 12)’ refers to someone who did not 
attend Grade 12. An examination of the NIDS Wave 1 dataset 
(http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/index.html) reveals the same percentage of unqualified adults as 




There is a challenge, not just in South Africa, to make the policy implications of 
patterns  seen  in  rates  of  return  analyses  clearer.  One  part  of  this  challenge  is  to 
examine  how  the  structure  of  the  country’s  qualifications  systems  impacts  on 
decisions and earnings in the labour market. This is not a well researched area, though 
analysis  from  the  United  Kingdom  points  to  ways  of  modelling  the  independent 
impact of education qualifications in a rates of return analysis (Dearden, 1999).  
In  South  Africa,  the  large  earnings  effects  associated  with  race  in  the  Mincerian 
earnings function, in particular the earnings advantage of whites, begs the following 9 
policy question: To what extent is this effect attributable to inequalities in the skills 
and knowledge of similarly qualified people (bearing in mind the strong legacy of 
apartheid inequality in educational quality), and to what extent is it attributable to 
unfair discrimination in the labour market? Burger (2009: 22) finds that of earnings 
inequality remaining after years of schooling have been taken into account, around 
two-thirds is attributable to educational inequality problems and one-third to residual 
factors of which labour market discrimination would be one. 
Finally,  rates  of  return  analyses  can  also  be  used  to  compare  income  returns  to 
different types of education at the same level. Psacharopoulos (1993: 48) provides a 
comparison of the rates of return for academic and vocational secondary schooling, 
and finds that when the higher costs of vocational schooling are taken into account, 
the returns to academic schooling are higher. At least anecdotally, this finding lies 
behind the rather lukewarm response of policymakers to vocational schooling. What 
might  the  situation  be  in  South  Africa,  where  recent  years  have  seen  substantial 
growth in the budgets and enrolments of pre-tertiary vocational schooling (the ‘FET 
colleges’), and the introduction of a new vocational curriculum? No published rates of 
return analysis seem to exist, though unpublished and exploratory analysis performed 
by one of the authors of this paper suggests that when controlling for race and gender, 
and taking into account private and public costs, historically vocational training has 
yielded better rates of return than ordinary schooling. This suggests that South Africa, 
like many other countries (Bennell, 1996), does not conform to the global pattern 
described by Psacharopoulos (1993).  10 
3. PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
Whilst  rates  of  return  analyses  are  central  to  attempts  to  explain  the  external 
efficiency  of  education  systems,  production  functions  assume  the  same  role  with 
respect  to  the  internal  efficiency  of  education  institutions.  Productions  functions 
essentially  aim  to  identify  which  education  inputs,  such  as  teacher  qualifications, 
availability of teaching materials, teaching time and so on, have the largest effect on 
outcomes  in  the  form  of  the  test  scores  of  pupils.  There  has  been  keen  interest 
amongst economists to explore this model, though for a number of reasons discussed 
below, the reception amongst policymakers has been mixed.  
Perhaps the most important reason to be sceptical about the use of a single production 
function study to inform policy is that the data used for the analysis were in most 
cases not compiled for the purpose of this kind analysis. For this reason, Hanushek 
(2002:  12),  a  prolific  analyst  in  this  area,  laments  the  fact  that  most  production 
function analysis is ‘opportunistic’. In particular, the ideal of test scores from two 
points in time, allowing for a value-added approach, and data at the level of pupils 
(including socio-economic data) and not just the school, is often not realised. Despite 
these problems, identifying what inputs emerge as important across several production 
function studies through meta-analyses, such as that produced by Hanushek (2002) for 
the United States, has come to be regarded as  a valuable process that can indeed 
inform policy. Of course this solution pre-supposes the existence of a critical mass of 
studies from the country concerned.   
Two  growing  realisations  in  the  education  sector  justify  having  more  and  better 
production function studies. One is the realisation that learning outcomes are a far 
more serious and elusive problem than is often assumed. The evidence from South 11 
Africa, but also from elsewhere, indicates that relatively high public spending and 
even well qualified teachers can easily co-exist with very poor education outcomes 
(Van der Berg, 2007). The second is the realisation that inputs that intuitively make 
sense as a means to improve outcomes are often not effective in reality – the case of 
reducing class sizes is discussed below.  
In South Africa a few studies have used pupil-level data to examine the production of 
learning results in primary schools: Van der Berg (2008) and Gustafsson (2007) using 
the 2000 Grade 6 SACMEQ (Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring 
Educational  Quality)  dataset,  and  Taylor  and  Yu  (2008)  using  the  2006  Grade  5 
PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) dataset. Studies focussing 
on secondary schooling have had to rely on school-level data: Crouch and Mabogoane 
(1998b), Van der Berg and Burger (2003), and Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2006). The 
South African findings regarding school inputs have been fairly intuitive ones. For 
instance, teacher housing in rural areas, libraries, and better teacher knowledge all 
advance pupil performance. The South African work has also confirmed what studies 
from elsewhere have found, namely that socio-economic status (SES), in particular 
the level of education of the pupil’s parents, plays a very large role, in fact a much 
larger role than is commonly believed. In most countries, SES has a somewhat greater 
influence over the performance differences between schools than all school resource 
factors combined (OECD, 2007: 171). 
Arguably the greatest policy influence that production function studies around the 
world have had relates to one factor that they rather consistently have said does not 
play a role in improving pupil performance, namely class size. This finding, obviously 
an important one from a budgetary perspective, has been taken rather seriously by 12 
policymakers. The question of class size illustrates the importance of distinguishing 
statistical significance from policy significance in an analysis. Certain models do in 
fact find class size to be a statistically significant predictor of pupil performance (see 
for instance Taylor and Yu, 2008), but even then, when coefficients are translated into 
financial values, it is nearly always found that reducing class sizes would be amongst 
the most costly of all the available policy interventions in the model, relative to the 
desired performance improvement. This translation of a production function into a 
cost  effectiveness  model,  by  bringing  in  actual  unit  costs,  is  seldom  done  in  the 
academic  literature  and  is  arguably  one  important  reason  why  policymakers  find 
production functions difficult to interpret. Mingat et al (2003: 56) as well as Pritchett 
and Filmer (1997) explain the methodology required for this translation. 
On the matter of class size, there is an important South African caveat. South Africa’s 
class sizes are exceptionally high by developing country standards. To illustrate, 16% 
of the country’s Grade 8 pupils examined in the 2003 run of TIMSS were in classes 
exceeding 55 pupils (Gustafsson and Patel, 2008: 25). In countries such as Botswana, 
Malaysia and Egypt the figure is considerably lower. Data from other years and other 
grades confirm this pattern. One wonders whether the orthodoxy on class size, partly 
resulting  from  production  function  findings,  has  perhaps  created  a  blind  spot  in 
education policymaking, considering how little policy attention has been devoted to 
excessively large classes. More focussed attention on the effects of extremely high 
class  sizes  in  the  South  African  production  function  work  may  reveal  that  South 
Africa’s exceptional situation allows one to detect important thresholds beyond which 
pupil performance is clearly affected by class size.  13 
A very practical application of the production function technique is demonstrated by 
Crouch and Mabogoane (1998a). In preparing a list of top performing schools, with 
respect to the Grade 12 examinations, for the Sunday Times newspaper they use both 
a  traditional  approach  of  simply  taking  the  best  results,  and  a  more  socio-
economically sensitive approach where they compare actual results to the expected 
results emerging from a production function. Given their socio-economic and other 
disadvantages,  one  would  not  expect  even  the  most  effective  historically 
disadvantaged schools to match the results of the best historically advantaged schools. 
When  one  controls  for  background  factors,  one  would  obviously  obtain  different 
measures  of  school  effectiveness.  In  the  list  using  the  first  approach,  only  one 
historically black public school appeared in a list of the ten best performing schools. 
In the list  using the second approach, nine of ten schools were historically  black 
public schools. The second approach clearly assists the education administration to 
identify  and  laud  schools  that  succeed  in  overcoming  difficult  contextual  and 
historical factors, and it assists in identifying schools that should be the subject of 
more  qualitative  case  studies  aimed  at  finding  out  what  makes  these  schools  so 
successful. (In 2009 the Sunday Times again published a list of top schools, but this 
time only the traditional approach was used, resulting in only one historically black 
public school amongst the top ten
3.) 
A discussion of production functions can probably not avoid including a reference to 
multi-level modelling (MLM), or hierarchical linear modelling (HLM). This method, 
employed for instance by  Gustafsson (2007), has become popular, but  has arguably 
made explaining production function findings an even more difficult task than it is 
when the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used. Johnes (2004: 647) finds 
                                                       
3 Sunday Times of 18 October 2009. 14 
multi-level modelling ‘computationally intractable’. It is probably too early to draw 
any  hard  conclusions  about  the  analytical  costs  relative  to  benefits  of  this  new 
method, partly because the MLM computer software is still not fully developed. 
Much of the challenge with respect to production function analysis lies in working 
towards data collections from schools that are better suited to this kind of analysis. 
This is likely to produce datasets that are better for a variety of analysis techniques, 
not just production functions. Crouch and Mabogoane (1998a) emphasise the need for 
better variables on school management in order to reduce the residual, or unexplained, 
part of South  African production functions.  One variable that is  rare  yet  of  great 
potential  importance  in  a  production  function  is  a  direct  measure  of  teacher 
knowledge. Such a variable will become available, for the first time in South Africa, 
on the release of the 2007 SACMEQ dataset, which includes scores of teachers in 
subject knowledge tests.  
What is striking in South Africa, is that the government’s sample-based Systemic 
Evaluation testing programme, which produces a dataset that is exceptionally well 
suited for production function analysis focussing on South African policy questions, 
has barely been used for this purpose due to lack of access to the dataset amongst 
researchers.  This  is  unlike  the  situation  in  Brazil  or  the  United  States,  where  the 
equivalent SAEB and NAEP datasets are widely available in research institutions. The 
institutional problems underlying the inaccessibility of data in South Africa should be 
resolved in the interests of a greater volume and variety of analysis that can inform 
difficult education policy decisions.  
Lastly, a word of warning by Hoenack (1996: 332) on the influence of production 
function work on education policymaking deserves mention. Underlying this work is 15 
a quest for the right ‘recipe’ for effective schooling, so that this can be expressed in 
the right policies and budgets. This whole approach obviously follows a rather top-
down paradigm. An alternative paradigm states that the education authorities should 
simply insist on good learning outcomes, and monitor such outcomes, and let schools 
themselves find the right recipes. Both arguments hold merits, depending partly on the 
kinds  of  schools  one  is  focussing  on.  Clearly,  production  functions  should  not 
reinforce an overly top-down policy agenda.  
4. TEACHER INCENTIVES 
Recent developments in the policy on teacher incentives in South Africa have been 
turbulent.  A  much  publicised  wage  agreement  with  unions  in  2008  saw  the 
introduction  of  salary  notch  increases  every  second  year  for  outstanding  teachers, 
where  the  evaluation  of  teachers  would  be  based  on  a  mix  of  schools-based  and 
external  inputs.  This  element  of  the  agreement  was  dropped  in  2009  due  to 
insufficient  support  from  unions.  It  appears  as  if  teacher  incentives  linking 
performance to pay, if introduced at all, need to be the outcome of a rigorous and 
inevitably time-consuming process of consultation and research.  
Economic analysis into teacher incentives has occurred in two key areas. The first 
looks at the core teacher salary as an incentive for joining the teaching profession and 
staying there. Because teacher pay is to a large degree determined through a political 
process,  and  not  in  an  open  market,  research  becomes  especially  important.  In 
economic terms, the determination of teacher pay in South Africa displays elements of 
both monopoly (there is in a sense one supplier, the teaching force represented by 
unions) and monopsony (there is largely just one buyer of teaching services, the state). 
The political nature of the wage negotiation process makes the risk high that teacher 16 
pay will be substantially higher or lower than it would have been if teacher pay had 
been more market-driven. In order to determine whether it is too high or too low, 
economists typically perform a conditional wage comparison between teachers and 
other  professionals  in  the  economy.  The  analysis  is  subject  to  a  number  of 
complexities,  including  how  to  define  the  group  of  professionals  against  which 
teachers are compared, how ‘teacher’ should be defined and how teacher productivity 
should  be  dealt  with.  Teacher  productivity  is  virtually  impossible  to  deal  with 
empirically in the analysis with the household data that are typically used for this kind 
of work. Yet it is important to at least acknowledge this dynamic. Basically, if the 
whole package of incentives, both monetary and non-monetary, for teachers is less 
effective than it is for other professionals, and teachers tend to be less productive than 
their peers in other professions, then equal pay for teachers would not be justified, at 
least not from an economic perspective.  
There are at least three South African conditional wage comparisons dealing with 
teachers: Crouch (2001), using data describing the situation up to 1999, Gustafsson 
and Patel (2008), using data stretching up to 2007, and Armstrong (2009), also using 
data up to 2007. The findings of the three are similar. Crouch (2001) finds teacher pay 
to be more or less comparable to that in other professions, and argues that if there is 
an  under-supply  of  teachers  in  South  Africa,  this  is  due  more  to  an  insufficient 
provisioning of teacher training than to a problem of poor pay dissuading prospective 
teachers. However, the  pay  scales  are said to  be  insufficiently  generous  for older 
teachers,  increasing  the  possibility  that  older  teachers  will  leave  the  profession. 
Gustafsson and Patel (2008: 18) explain that the administered nature of teacher pay 
tends to result in a situation where the actual spread of pay over years of experience 
does not match the official salary scales, because when the official scales change, they 17 
are not implemented retroactively, meaning that the actual pay of teachers will to a 
large degree be a reflection of previously existing official scales. Like Crouch (2001), 
they  find  that  older  teachers  are  under-paid,  but  conclude  that  more  generous 
increments  linked  to  years  of  experience  introduced  in  2008  will  over  the  years 
eliminate this problem (2009 policy developments have however removed some but 
not all of this deferred generosity). Gustafsson and Patel (2009) emphasise that the 
employer needs to signal the existence of future incentives to prospective teachers in 
an active manner as they are not visible if the prospective teacher simply looks at 
what older teachers are currently earning. Armstrong (2009) finds that the incentives 
to stay within the teaching profession are stronger for those teachers with fewer years 
of training. 
The second key area of analysis looks at incentives in the more typical sense, in other 
words  at  incentives  given  to  those  who  perform  exceptionally  well.  Despite  such 
incentives  being  a  highly  topical  policy  issue,  there  has  been  little  work  of  an 
academic nature in South Africa on this subject. There are arguably two key things 
that should inform the policy process. One is better data on the choices teachers make 
and their perceptions. To some extent such data are collected in programmes such as 
SACMEQ  and  the  Systemic  Evaluation.  However,  a  dedicated  and  nationally 
representative teacher survey, something that has not been conducted in South Africa 
previously, would be of enormously greater value. In the absence of data from such a 
survey, the policy process ends up relying too heavily on the assumption that teacher 
unions are able to represent adequately what incentivises teachers, an assumption that 
will clearly not always be a sound basis for policy.  18 
The second need is for a South African adaptation of theory from elsewhere relating 
to teacher incentives. Because the actual implementation of performance incentives 
for  teachers,  in  developing  and  developed  countries,  is  rather  limited,  and  the 
effectiveness of the programmes that do exist has often not been properly studied, 
much  of  the  emphasis  must  currently  be  on  simply  clarifying  what  economic 
principles have to say about the design of optimal incentives. The value of clarifying 
key concepts should not be under-estimated. In particular, there is a need for a better 
taxonomy  of  teacher  incentives  and  their  likely  intended  and  unintended 
consequences. In South Africa there has arguably not been enough consideration of 
the full range of options, and it has been assumed that incentives for individuals are as 
workable in public schools as they are in the private sector. Because the hierarchy 
amongst  teachers  in  schools  is  traditionally  rather  flat,  and  because  educational 
quality is inevitably a team effort where the impact of individual teachers is difficult 
to determine, rewarding individual teachers may have a divisive effect, as opposed to 
an  efficiency  enhancement  effect.  Insofar  as  the  literature  supports  performance 
incentives, it tends to support incentives  for whole schools, rather than individual 
teachers.  
Chile is perhaps the developing country that has gone furthest in developing teacher 
incentive  programmes,  and  in  analysing  its  existing  practices.  In  particular,  Chile 
provides valuable lessons in the design of teacher incentives pegged at the school, and 
not individual level (Mizala and Romaguera, 2005). A rare example of a randomised 
evaluation  study  focussing  on  the  effects  of  teacher  incentives  is  documented  by 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2006). The study, which used a sample of primary 
schools in India, found clear evidence that monetary incentives for teachers improved 
test results.  19 
5. BENEFIT-INCIDENCE ANALYSIS 
A  society  where  it  is  widely  felt  that  people’s  opportunities  in  life  are  unfairly 
distributed cannot be a healthy society. In the economic literature, recent empirical 
evidence indicates that where inequality in developing countries is great, economic 
growth is retarded (Barro, 2000). As the foregoing discussion has suggested, social 
and income inequalities are perpetuated by unsound education policies that fail to 
educate  the  poor.  Whilst  society  waits  for  educational  changes  to  take  effect,  the 
redistribution of resources through the tax system and pro-poor spending policies can, 
firstly,  assist  in  alleviating  poverty  and,  secondly,  eradicate  poverty  through,  in 
particular,  investments  in  the  education  of  the  poor.  The  second  aim,  of  actually 
eradicating poverty, is the more difficult one, and is conditional on effective spending 
policies and practices.  
Benefit-incidence  analysis  typically  uses  a  combination  of  unit  cost  figures  from 
public accounts and data on the use of public services from household surveys to draw 
conclusions such as that 35% of public spending goes towards the poorest 20% of the 
population, and that public spending is thus pro-poor. Comparisons between countries 
using the same approach can reveal important patterns. For instance, Davoodi et al 
(2003:  21)  argue  that  Sub-Saharan  Africa  has  been  particularly  unsuccessful  at 
targeting public education spending towards the poor. For example, at the secondary 
level  only  7.4%  of  spending  goes  towards  the  poorest  20%  of  the  population  on 
average. 
In  South  Africa,  Van  der  Berg  (2005  and  2009)  has  calculated  benefit  incidence 
patterns for a range of public services, including education. This analysis indicates 
that public spending in 2006 on primary and secondary schooling was clearly pro-20 
poor, and well targeted by international standards (Van der Berg, 2009: 13). It also 
reveals  that  between  1993  and  2006  there  has  been  a  clear  trend  towards  better 
targeting of the poor (Van der Berg, 2005: 8 and Van der Berg, 2009: 14). The public 
funding of tertiary education reveals a different pattern. As in virtually all countries, 
in South Africa this funding is pro-rich, though in South Africa it is even more so than 
elsewhere. Van der Berg (2009) explains that this finding could be influenced by an 
important data problem, namely that in the household data poor students living away 
from their families are likely to appear artificially better off than their families  of 
origin actually are.  
Van  der  Berg  (2009)  points  to  a  few  common  areas  of  misunderstanding.  The 
standard benefit incidence approach of examining the breakdown of public education 
spending  by  quintile  of  the  population  means  that  the  age  pyramid  of  different 
segments of the population will influence the results. Above all, if a larger proportion 
of the poor are young, which is the case in most countries, then a pro-poor pattern will 
emerge even if the state spends an equal amount on each pupil. In fact, if just public 
spending per enrolled pupil is considered, then public spending is slightly pro-rich, 
and  not  pro-poor  as  seen  in  the  typical  benefit  incidence  analysis  approach 
(Gustafsson and Patel, 2007). It is obviously important for education policymakers to 
recognise the differences between the two approaches.  
The finding that education inputs, at least at the schooling level, are more or less 
equitably distributed is an important finding for policymakers as it provides evidence 
that ambitious post-1994 policies to correct the highly distorted spending patterns of 
the apartheid era have paid off. There is thus ample empirical justification for the 
current  and  rather  strong  policy  shift  away  from  education  inputs  and  towards 21 
education  outcomes.  Clearly  there  are  education  input  issues  that  must  still  be 
resolved,  but  devoting  the  bulk  of  the  policy  attention  towards  outcomes  appears 
completely justified and necessary.  
Substantial public funding for the poor in South Africa would suggest that private 
inputs would be low. The evidence suggests that this is the case. The analysis by 
Gustafsson and Patel (2006: 71) indicates that overall around 8% of the funding of 
public  schools  is  private,  though  for  the  poorest  two  quintiles  it  was  around  2%. 
Kattan and Burnett (2004) find that private inputs into public primary schooling in 
many other developing countries are at a substantially higher level: 21% in China, 
43% in India and 30% in Ghana. They moreover find that policy analysis into private 
inputs into public primary schooling is often confounded by definitional problems. 
Many countries that claim to have abolished ‘fees’ in fact still demand parents to pay, 
for instance, for textbooks because textbooks are not regarded as a part  of ‘fees’. 
UNESCO’s definition of fees (at least as it appears in UNESCO, 2002: 55) seems to 
support the notion of textbooks not being a part of fees, though many policy analysts 
would  view  things  differently.  In  South  Africa,  at  least  anecdotally,  the  newly 
declared no fee schools for the poor have in many cases simply renamed what were 
previously ‘fees’ as ‘voluntary donations’. Though private contributions to schooling 
in South Africa may not be large, at least by international standards, they receive 
considerable policy attention and warrant better analysis. For this, Stats SA’s Income 
and Expenditure Survey data would be useful. But apart from clarifying the numbers, 
it  is  necessary  to  gain  a  better  idea  of  the  reasons  why  even  parents  in  poor 
communities often encourage private contributions into the school fund. It is unlikely 
that insufficient public funding is the only reason. There are probably also reasons 
relating to the way schools are viewed and utilised by parent communities.    22 
6. CROSS-COUNTRY MODELS 
Even simple cross-country comparisons can be very informative for policymakers. 
Often they are able to correct misperceptions or at least nuance existing perceptions 
within one country. In the case of South Africa, they have indicated that although the 
top decile of pupils, in terms of test results, perform exceedingly well compared to the 
remainder of pupils, they in fact do not perform well compared to the top decile of 
other middle income countries (see for instance Mullis et al (2004: 34)). Despite the 
common perception in South Africa that too many pupils drop out of education before 
the completion of twelve years of schooling, a cross-country analysis reveals that in 
terms of secondary school completion South Africa is slightly above the average for 
similarly developed countries (Gustafsson and Morduchowicz, 2008: 28).  
The  increasing  availability  of  internationally  comparable  educational  quality  data 
have allowed for new insights into education and country development. Above all, 
these data have allowed the adaptation of the traditional cross-country growth models 
so  that  they  include  a  consideration  of  educational  quality,  and  not  just  years  of 
schooling. This adaptation has profound education policy implications. Above all, it is 
implied that focussing exclusively on increasing enrolments in developing countries, 
without explicitly considering improvements in pupil performance, can be misguided 
(Hanushek and Woessman, 2007).  
Statistical inference becomes difficult in cross-country models due to the unavoidable 
fact that the number of countries in the world are limited. Techniques to deal with 
these difficulties exist (Sala-i-Martin  et  al,  2004),  yet  cross-country analysis must 
inevitably be a mix of statistical analysis and careful  assessment of historical and 
political context.  23 
There seem to be two areas of exploration with respect to cross-country analysis that 
should interest education policymakers. Firstly, as summarised recently by Stiglitz et 
al  (2009),  there  are  important  debates  about  what  country  development  indicators 
policymakers should be focussing on. Clearly,  the traditional economic growth  or 
GDP per capita indicators are inadequate on their own and too much focus on them 
can be dangerous, for instance if income inequality is ignored. However, development 
models using non-traditional dependent variables such as happiness or freedom from 
poverty are still rare, partly due to data availability problems. Yet one potentially 
valuable  data  source  that  has  received  little  attention  in  this  regard  is  the  World 
Values  Survey  (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/).  South  Africa  was  one  of  54 
countries  participating  in  the  2005-2008  wave  of  this  survey.  For  South  Africa, 
responses were collected from 3,000 adults relating to education, a variety of political 
and social values, and one’s sense of satisfaction with life. The data lend itself to both 
cross-country and one-country analysis.  
The second area of exploration is  cross-country models  designed to  predict not  a 
development indicator such as GDP growth, but educational quality as measured by 
standardised test scores. In such models explanatory variables would cover education 
policy choices made by particular countries. What is currently rather clear from the 
literature is that a policy intervention that does not appear to be associated with better 
educational quality is higher spending per pupil (Hanushek and Woessman, 2007: 60). 
Bishop  (1997)  offers  one  of  the  few  cross-country  models  currently  in  existence 
indicating something that does appear to contribute towards better quality, namely the 
presence  of  standardised  examinations.  Bishop’s  (1997)  focus  is  on  developed 
countries. Similar analysis including developing countries and other policy variables 24 
such as age of entry into schooling and level of parent involvement in schools is likely 
to be useful for policymakers.  
7. CONCLUSION 
The five models used to organise the discussion in the previous five sections do not 
encompass all that there is in the economics of education field. In particular, two more 
operational areas of analysis have been excluded. One is the estimation of ideal unit 
costs in, say, primary schooling for countries at a particular level of development. 
Psacharopoulos (1996), in a paper which, like this one, explores a possible economics 
of education agenda, emphasises the need for work in this area. The second area is 
teacher  supply  and  demand  analysis.  Here  too  little  work  has  occurred  in  South 
Africa.  Crouch  (2001)  puts  forward  a  simple  model  for  South  Africa,  but  as  he 
himself admits, it is exploratory. 
Within the previous five sections, not all the work that has occurred in South Africa in 
these five areas, but rather a selection of this work, has been discussed. Arguably, 
output  in  the  form  of  economics  of  education  papers  in  South  Africa  seems 
comparable  to  the  level  of  outputs  in  other  middle  income  developing  countries. 
However, this is not the same as saying that the level of output is adequate to inform 
the range of often very pressing policy questions. Above, it has been argued that there 
are important areas where more should be done (production functions, for instance) 
and areas which have barely been touched (teacher incentives, particularly). The most 
critical  gap seems to be the absence of theoretical and empirical work relating to 
teacher incentives, in the broadest sense of the word. Teachers are at the centre of the 
education process, and yet the factors that influence their current productivity, and the 
factors that might improve that productivity, are not well understood.  25 
An economics of education research agenda for South Africa, based on the discussion 
in the preceding sections, may look as follows.  
Rates of return. Here a clearer sense of what the typical rates of return analyses mean 
for policymakers is important. Put differently, what needs to change in our education 
policies  for  the  rates  of  return  to  improve? Perhaps  some  atypical  rates  of  return 
analysis that took into account the qualifications that people have would throw new 
light  onto  what  should  be  done  with  the  qualifications  structure  of  the  schooling 
system.  Rates  of  return  comparisons  of  general  and  vocational  education  could 
become  an  important  empirical  input  into  the  current  policy  shift  towards  higher 
enrolments in FET colleges.  
Production  functions.  Considering  that  these  models  are  most  informative  for 
policymakers when there are many of them, it is important to build on the stock of 
existing local literature and to perform periodic meta-analyses. Policymakers are best 
served by production function analyses that incorporate a final cost effectiveness step, 
so that the meaning of the coefficients can be understood in familiar language. Class 
size thresholds are a matter that seems to deserve more focussed attention.  
Teacher incentives. Periodic comparisons of teacher pay to pay in other professions 
will always be necessary. With regard to teacher incentives, there is much work to do. 
What can be done without new data is to apply the knowledge that has been gained in 
other countries, with respect to theory, empirical evidence and policy design, to the 
South African context in order to clarify key issues around which there is still too 
much  confusion.  New  data  on  the  behaviour  and  preferences  of  South  Africa’s 
teachers would greatly assist in determining what kinds of incentives will work best.  26 
Benefit  incidence.  Here  it  is  necessary  to  build  on  the  existing  stock  of  standard 
benefit incidence analysis to monitor the progressivity of public spending into the 
future. Further interrogation of the socio-economic status of tertiary students might 
produce revisions of the country’s very regressive distribution of public expenditure 
on tertiary education. The incidence of private spending on education could be better 
investigated with the existing data.  
Cross-country  models.  Exploring  the  relationship  between  education  and  non-
traditional country development indicators (other than growth or per capita income) 
represents an exciting frontier. The same can be said of cross-country models that 
explore the impact of the education policy choices that countries make on education 
outcomes, in particular educational quality.    
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